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convert them, then the present volume will provide them with ready access to the 
detail they will need if they are to apply monetary data to wider economic and 
historical questions. 
NICK MAYHEW, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford
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 For Douglas Allen, the past can be divided roughly into two eras: the old times, 
characterized by peculiar and exotic institutions, such as dueling, venality, and 
patronage, and the modern era, characterized by wages and prices, technology, and 
meritocracy. Allen argues that the transition, c. 1850, from the old world to the new 
was effected by more precise, standardized systems of measurement. Before the 
modern era it was impossible to measure the most basic things: time, distance, trade 
volume, labor productivity. As economies gradually expanded with the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution, new institutions, such as standardized forms of measurement, 
were created to reduce transactions costs, making growth and wealth creation possible. 
 Allen warns the reader in the preface that he is not a historian, and predicts that 
“historians will likely be appalled by [his] failure to elaborate on the nuances of 
change and [his] reluctance to qualify general statements” (p. xiii). Perhaps. They will 
certainly be surprised to learn that the aristocracy “generated wealth” rather than 
appropriated rents (p. 56), that unfree labor was a voluntary arrangement (pp. 41?42), 
that free wage labor arose in the nineteenth century as a result of more accurate time 
measurement (pp. 42?43), that justice was a private affair in England until the 
nineteenth century (p. 191), and that the modern family, based on “love marriages,” 
emerged in the mid-twentieth century (p. 220). Especially problematic is the complete 
absence of supporting evidence for these and other sweeping empirical claims: 
premodern institutions “were designed to solve incentive problems” (p. 7); the 
inability to measure variance is “the fact of life that creates interesting institutional 
innovations” (p. 23); and “[p]rior to the middle of the eighteenth century, it was 
simply not worth the effort . . . to distinguish between the role of nature and . . . 
humans in production” (p. 43). 
 Allen offers numerous examples of premodern institutions that, in his view, 
minimized variance in a society where it was impossible to separate the inputs of 
nature from those of humans. He explains how each of these institutions, including the 
aristocracy, dueling, the sale of army commissions, and private road provision, might 
be seen as addressing measurement costs. Aristocratic notions of trust and honor, 
for instance, should be seen as institutions for monitoring behavior in the absence of 
more effective measures. It is somewhat surprising that Allen makes no effort in this 
study to engage with more systematic attempts to measure input and output in the 
past. Wage and price data, for instance, exist for premodern societies, going back, in 
the English case, to the medieval period. Surely we can assume that these data reflect 
attempts to measure something? Allen might at least have told us why he thinks 
premodern systems of wages and prices were less effective than the modern systems 
that, in his view, emerged in the nineteenth century. Few would argue that innovation 
in measurement was insignificant to the development of modern economies. But the
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handwaving approach taken here—in the past, we had trust and personal ties, in the 
modern world, we have measurement—does not shed much empirical light on the 
economic significance of the measurement revolution. 
 The theoretical framework is equally unsatisfying. This is a story about the 
importance of institutions to economic development. But Allen’s account of 
institutions is fundamentally inconsistent. On the one hand, he shares the starting point 
of the new institutional economics: any institution should be viewed as efficient within 
a particular set of constraints. Thus the aristocracy and all its seemingly peculiar 
behaviors was a successful solution to the problem of high measurement costs in 
the premodern world. He repeatedly refers to institutions as solutions that “society” 
“chooses” or “designs” to address the problem of transactions costs, although the 
actual processes whereby these choices are made, and by whom, are never described. 
There are always competing solutions, he says, but the successful ones tend to win out. 
(The obvious question, “successful for whom?” is not addressed.) 
 On the other hand, Allen is perfectly aware that many places in the world have 
rather unsuccessful institutions (for economic growth, at least). But how can that be, if 
the most efficient institutions are always chosen? He tries to extricate himself from 
this inconsistency by relativizing institutional efficiency to the larger institutional 
framework of the respective society. Thus western institutions fail in modern LDCs 
because they are only efficient in their western contexts. This is an important point, 
but it undermines the story he wants to tell. For it means that the new systems of 
measurement he sees as part of the transition to modernity are efficient only in the 
context of an English institutional framework and have little significance for economic 
development in the rest of the world. And, since many parts of the world have adopted 
modern, standardized systems of measurement, but without revolutionary effects for 
their economies, it is indeed reasonable to assume that other parts of the English 
institutional framework were more critical for economic growth.  
 The idea that the reduction of variance had significant effects on economic 
development is not an uninteresting one, and Allen’s enthusiasm for his theory comes 
through in his writing. But enthusiasm is no substitute for empirical evidence or 
theoretical coherence, and so the reader remains unconvinced. 
TRACY DENNISON, California Institute of Technology
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 In Making Tobacco Bright, Barbara Hahn has produced an important addition to the 
histories of agriculture and technology. It is a major undertaking to analyze the causes 
and consequences of the changes that occurred in the tobacco industry over a 320-year 
period; it is even more impressive to link these changes to evolving political, 
economic, and social conditions. This is precisely what Hahn has achieved. 
Her overarching thesis is that agricultural technologies are constructed by humans 
rather than the products of nature. She uses the history of tobacco to illustrate this 
general premise. The extent to which tobacco culture, manufacturing, and distribution
